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Abstract

Automatic Voter Registration is a recently introduced policy that simplifies the process of
registering to vote in order to increase voter turnout rates. This capstone estimates how
successful this policy has been. To that end, I used a difference-in-differences research design to
consider voter registration and turnout rates seen in the Congressional general elections over the
period from 2010 to 2018 in Oregon and Washington. I found that the implementation of
Automatic Voter Registration led to a small but statistically significant increase in voter
registration and voter turnout rates in Oregon relative to both the prior trend seen in that state and
to Washington, a counterfactual state without Automatic Voter Registration during these
elections. However, due to the limited nature of this study focused on five elections in one corner
of the United States, a more comprehensive study is needed to confirm that this increase is
replicable in other areas.
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Executive Summary
Voter turnout rates in the United States have traditionally been lower than those seen in peer
countries. One reason for this is variation in voter registration processes, which may stop some
who are interested in voting but failed to get registered in time. Automatic Voter Registration is a
relatively new policy in which eligible citizens are provided an opt-out opportunity to become
registered voters following routine interactions with other government agencies. The goal is to
encourage more citizens to vote. After first being passed in Oregon in 2015, twenty states and the
District of Columbia have implemented Automatic Voter Registration with some variations.
Because this is such a new policy, there has not yet been much work done to determine if it has
the predicted effect or how much impact it has. In this capstone, I hypothesized that Automatic
Voter Registration would be associated with increases in the numbers of registered voters and in
voter turnout. To test this, this capstone examines county-level data on the Congressional general
elections between 2010 and 2018 in Oregon and Washington using a difference-in-differences
research design. This project utilized official election data from the respective Secretaries of
State and demographic data from the American Communities Survey. Following the analysis, I
conclude that Automatic Voter Registration led to small but statistically significant increases in
both voter registration and voter turnout in Oregon relative to Washington. However, the limited
scope of this project suggests that a more comprehensive study involving a more diverse sample
of the United States and over a more extended period is needed.

4

Background and Theoretical Framework
The basis of a democratic form of government lies in the idea that the people select
representatives who reflect them as a whole; then, these representatives implement policies that
the people support and benefit from. However, if a substantial proportion of the people fail to
make their voice heard, it can be said that these representatives do not reflect their constituents.
In the US, voter turnout rates are typically about 60% of the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) in
Presidential election years and about 40% of VEP in midterm years (Fairvote, 2020). These rates
are lower than the average seen in peer countries. A Pew study examining voter turnout rates for
the most recent national elections among the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) found that the US ranked 30th out of the 35 nations considered. This
study reported that about 55.72% of the Voting Age Population (VAP) of the US voted in the
2016 Presidential election. 1 In contrast, the OECD turnout rates ranged from 36.06% VAP
turnout seen in Switzerland’s 2019 Parliamentary elections to 88.97% seen in Turkey’s 2018
elections. The OECD average was approximately 62.70% (Desilver, 2020).
While there are likely innumerable factors that explain this variation, a large component
is explained by differences in how elections are conducted. For instance, many of the countries
with the highest turnout rates use compulsory voting, in which all voters are required to
participate in elections to avoid some penalty. While it is likely that introducing compulsory
voting would increase voter turnout rates, it would also likely be difficult to introduce such a

There are several different ways to define the voting population used in the voter turnout literature. Some just
use population as it is traditionally defined, the number of people living in an area. Some limit it to only those of
the appropriate age to vote, the Voting Age Population (VAP). Some further limit VAP to only include citizens, the
Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP). Finally, some further limit CVAP to Voting Eligible Population (VEP), which
excludes those who are legally ineligible to vote in their states (most often convicted felons and mentally
incompetent individuals). The more precise definitions are preferable to limit measurement bias, but they are also
harder to collect data for (Holbrook and Heidbreder 2010).
1
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policy in the US. Consider the blowback seen surrounding the similar individual mandate
component of the Affordable Care Act. Instead, another policy lever may be adjusted to increase
voter turnout. Another component of the election system that differentiates the US from its peer
countries is voter registration. While most European states will put in most of the effort of
registering voters, the US has traditionally tasked individual voters with this decision. As a
result, the decision to vote is transformed into a series of time-sensitive decisions. To cast their
ballot, prospective voters must first decide to be registered before they can later vote. Because
registration has typically been required to be completed weeks or months prior to the election,
the deadline may pass before low propensity voters start paying attention to the election. Even if
they are later persuaded to vote, they would not be able to participate. As a result, voter
registration requirements may cause lower voter turnout rates.
There have been prior reforms intended to resolve this issue. These reforms can be
divided into two broad categories. Firstly, some states have expanded the registration window by
allowing Election Day Registration (or Same Day Registration for states with early voting
windows), allowing unregistered individuals who decide to vote to register at their polling place
and cast a provisional ballot. Secondly, there have been reforms that were intended to simplify
the process of voter registration. The most impactful of these was the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NRVA), which mandated that states simplify and streamline their
voter registration processes. As part of this, government agencies that people routinely work
with, including Departments of Motor Vehicles and public assistance agencies, were given the
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Figure 1. States with Automatic Voter Registration by Year of Implementation. Source: National
Conference of State Legislatures
ability to register voters and were required to offer this service to every citizen they worked with.
Because this has often happened when citizens were applying for or renewing their driver’s
licenses, the National Voter Registration Act has become commonly known as Motor Voter.
While early studies of Motor Voter found that it increased voter turnout, later studies have been
more mixed (Knack 1995, Highton and Wolfinger 1998, Brown and Wedeking 2006). One
reason for this is the fact that Motor Voter still treated voter registration as something citizens
have to opt into. As a result, it is possible that there are voters who had not yet decided to vote at
that point, so they opted to not get registered. Because Motor Voter was intended to encourage
participation among low propensity voters, many of the people that Motor Voter was intended to
7

help register may not have been affected by this policy. To resolve this problem, some states
have modified their implementation of Motor Voter to instead require citizens to opt out of being
registered. Instead of giving citizens the option of registering to vote, it is instead done
automatically as part of the agency’s application process. This has led to these policies being
known as Automatic Voter Registration (AVR). If a citizen truly does not want to be registered,
they can still opt out but getting registered is now the default option. There is a wide literature in
areas as diverse as the choice to participate in employer-based retirement plans, organ donor
participation, and student loan repayment plans that has concluded that structuring a policy such
that the default option is the preferred policy outcome leads to higher acceptance rates relative to
structures that require individuals to choose to participate (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, Johnson
and Goldstein 2003, Jachimowicz, et al. 2019, Cox, Kreisman and Dynarski 2020). Because
opting out requires more effort from individuals, supporters of AVR claim that implementing
AVR should therefore result in more voter registration than Motor Voter did.
Implementation of Automatic Voter Registration
AVR was first passed in Oregon in 2015 and has since expanded to include twenty states and the
District of Columbia. Figure 1 shows when each state implemented Automatic Voter
Registration using data sourced from the National Conference of State Legislatures. As a broad
overview, AVR allows an automatic electronic transfer of data from agencies like the
Department of Motor Vehicles 2 to the state Elections department, as both of these groups use
similar information. Once there, the data are compared to the existing voter rolls. If the
individual is unregistered, a new registration entry will be created for them. If they are already

With the exception of Alaska, every AVR state allows registration to take place at the DMV. Alaska only allows
AVR at its Permanent Fund Dividend Division. Ten AVR states, including Oregon, only allow AVR at the DMV. The
remaining AVR states, including Washington, allow AVR at other state agencies at the discretion of the governor or
secretary of state. This is detailed further in the Appendix.

2
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registered, the registration can be updated to include new information listed on the application if
it has changed. Although all of these states have this same general process, there is variation in
the exact mechanics of AVR in these states. In Alaska, Massachusetts, and Oregon, the voter
registration is completely automated: the option to opt-out is presented by a postcard mailed to
each non-registered person that summarizes the data that will be provided to the registration
rolls, and they are given a deadline to opt out. All of the other states with AVR allow the person
to opt out while they are still at the agency. As part of the application process, they are shown a
screen that details the information that will be used to register them. This also gives them an
opportunity to ask follow-up questions for information that is only relevant to the voter
registration, such as political party affiliation (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2020).It is likely that this difference would result in a greater registration impact in Alaska,
Massachusetts, and Oregon than elsewhere because I would expect few to undergo this opt-out
process. This would be an interesting component of a more extensive study, but it is outside of
the scope of this capstone.
Same Day Registration
Although this capstone is focused on AVR, there are other reforms intended to decrease the
negative impact of the registration process. The most prominent is Same Day Registration, which
allows non-registered voters to register at their polling place. They are then allowed to cast a
provisional ballot until their voter file is verified by state officials. While this should also be
associated with an increase in voter turnout, this delay suggests that more votes from Same Day
Registration will be rejected than votes from AVR voters. Provisional ballots are often discarded
and, since they are not counted until after the election, little can be done to resolve their issues.
Since AVR is done before the election, there would be a greater chance that prospective voters
would be able to fix whatever issues were found from verification and would therefore be able to
9

cast their ballot. While this would likely be a small effect, that would suggest that AVR may be
associated with larger increases in voter turnout than Same Day Registration. However, this
question is outside the scope of this project because neither Oregon nor Washington had Same
Day Registration during the elections studied in this capstone (National Conference of State
Legislatures 2020). Washington passed it in 2018 but it was not implemented until June 20, 2019
(Washington Elections Division n.d.).
Similarly, this additional time to review provisional ballots also allows more time for voter
verification, which may be a convincing argument for those who are concerned about election
integrity. Mann, Gronke and Adona note that these two characteristics of AVR may explain
some of the bipartisan history of AVR, which has been passed with support from both parties in
both blue-leaning states like Rhode Island and red-leaning states like West Virginia. the
“potential to increase [voter] access” appeals to liberals and the potential to “increase [the]
integrity of elections” appeals to conservatives, AVR may be seen as more bipartisan than other
electoral reforms (2020, 693).
Hypotheses
This capstone will examine the impact of passing and implementing AVR on voter turnout. AVR
affects voter registration, which then affects voter turnout. As a result of this, we need to
consider AVR’s impact on both voter registration and voter turnout. As a result, this capstone
has two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Implementing AVR will cause an increase in the voter registration
rate relative to the status quo.
Hypothesis 2: Implementing AVR will cause an increase in the voter turnout rate
relative to the status quo.
10

I expect that voter registration rates will increase more in states with AVR than in states without
AVR. However, the impact on voter turnout may be less clear. One of the primary arguments
from opponents of AVR is that being registered alone does not always encourage higher voter
participation. As a result, getting more voters registered may not actually affect the voter turnout
rate. This was seen previously following the adoption of the 26th Amendment to the US
Constitution, which lowered the voting age from 21 to 18: although it allowed more participants
in elections (therefore increasing the voting eligible population), these participants typically vote
in lower numbers than other age groups and the voter turnout rate actually decreased.
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Literature Review
In general, the decision to vote is typically thought of in the voting turnout literature as a twostep process. First, a citizen must decide to get registered. Then a registered voter must choose to
vote. Therefore, reforms intended to increase voter turnout can be targeted at either step. For
instance, policies like absentee or mail voting or rules that define the number of polling locations
in an area are intended to affect the actual decision to vote. However, this capstone is focused on
policies that primarily affect registration and that affect voter turnout indirectly.
In general, most studies in the voter turnout literature rely on similar independent
variables. A meta-analysis of 185 voter turnout studies performed between 2002 and 2015
studying both national and subnational elections throughout the world found that each study used
at least one of the following 14 independent variables: “population size, population
concentration, population stability, income homogeneity, ethnic homogeneity, proportion of
minorities, past turnout, electoral closeness, campaign expenditures, political fragmentation,
electoral system, compulsory voting, concurrent elections and the [strictness of] registration
requirements (Cancela and Geys 2016, 266).” Cancela and Geys also found that there was
variation based on the level of the election: for subnational elections like those examined in this
capstone, the most important measures included population size, population stability, proportion
of minorities, electoral closeness, and concurrent elections (270). Similarly, a meta-analysis of
135 articles published between 2004 and 2013 found that the most important voter turnout
variables were compulsory voting, the importance of elections, and population size (Stockemer
2017).
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Because Automatic Voter Registration is a relatively new policy in the US, its impact has
not been measured in many academic studies yet. However, a study from the Center for
American Progress used a cross-nested multilevel model to show that voters who were registered
using AVR were more representative of the broader population in Oregon than voters who were
registered in the traditional method. This was because “younger, more rural, lower-income, and
more ethnically diverse” individuals were registered at increased rates relative to preimplementation years (Griffin, et al. 2017). A broader study from the Brennan Center for Justice
used matching at the census tract level to compare the eight states that used AVR in the first
thirty-five weeks in 2017 to demographically similar census tracts in non-AVR states, finding a
statistically significant increase in registration rate in each compared to the same period in 2013
(Morris and Dunphy 2019). Internationally, most of our peer countries have compulsory voter
registration, which is typically done with no input from citizens by national agencies. However,
Chile transitioned from an election system with optional registration but compulsory voting to a
system using automatic voter registration with optional voting in 2012: this new combination of
electoral policies led to significant increases in registration but significant decreases in turnout in
the next two national elections (Barnes and Rangel 2014).
In contrast, the similar policy created by the National Voter Registration Act has a much
longer history in the literature, given its introduction in 1993. Results have been somewhat
mixed. Early studies like Knack (1995) and Highton and Wolfinger (1998) found that NVRA
was associated with increases in registration and voter turnout. Later studies found either
increased results in early years but more modest increases in later years or found that NVRA
increased voter registration but not turnout (Brown and Wedeking 2006). Brown and Wedeking
(2006) point out that policies intended to make registration easier like NVRA or AVR are
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targeted to the segment of the population with the lowest motivation to participate, which may
“create a pool of registered voters who…are unwilling or unable to overcome the registration
hurdle” and therefore “dilute” the pool of registered voters by lowering the voter turnout rate. In
short, it is possible that AVR by itself would have little impact on voter turnout because it is
focused on a population that is not interested in participating and would therefore need to be
paired with efforts to increase that side of the equation too.
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Research Design
To test these hypotheses, this capstone will exploit variation in voter registration systems to
construct a difference-in-differences research design. Using this research design, I will compare
a state that implemented AVR to a demographically and electorally similar state that did not
implement AVR during the period being considered in this capstone. If the treatment and control
groups had similar enough trends in registration and voter turnout prior to implementing AVR,
the only difference between the treatment and control groups will be AVR. As a result, the
control group will serve as a counterfactual for the treatment group by providing an estimate of
what would have happened to the treatment group in the absence of AVR. Because both states
were examined before and after implementation, this research design will control for timeinvariant unmeasured characteristics of these states that would otherwise bias our results. As a
result, we will have an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect of implementing AVR.
For this capstone, I used Oregon as the treatment state and Washington as the control
state, with counties as the observation unit. The data have been constructed into a balanced panel
data set, with data being collected for each county in each election year. To ensure a balanced
panel, this capstone will focus on elections to the federal House of Representatives, for which
every seat is up for election every two years. Because of turnout differences between general
elections, primary elections, and special elections, this capstone will only consider general
elections. I chose to focus on the county level for several reasons. Firstly, this increased the
amount of possible variation within the dataset. The two states are apportioned a total of fifteen
Congressional Districts; in contrast, both states have a total of seventy-five counties. . Although
a focus on smaller areas like census tracts would further increase variation, the county level was
the most granular level for which registration and turnout data are available. The availability of
15

data has also shaped this project by limiting the analysis to elections between 2010 and 2018.
This project was heavily reliant on data collected by the US Census Bureau as part of the
American Communities Survey. More specifically, the Census Bureau started publishing CVAP
data from the 5-year ACS in 2009. These data are not yet available for the 2020 election because
the Census Bureau suspended all work on the 2020 CVAP dataset on January 12, 2021 following
the end of the Census Bureau’s participation in the Trump administration’s attempt to exclude
undocumented residents of the US from the 2020 Census (Wang 2021).
One point that needs to be made is that both of these states are currently using AVR for
their elections. Oregon passed AVR in 2015 with HB2177 and first implemented it in 2016.
Although Washington passed AVR in 2018, it was not effective until July 1, 2019 (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2020). As a result, AVR would not have affected the
Congressional elections in the state in 2018 or in any other year under consideration within this
study. While there is a possibility that the public discussion of AVR may have reminded some
Washington voters about the need to register before the election, my conclusion is that this likely
will not negatively affect the analysis.

Variables

Because of this project’s hypotheses, this capstone uses two models. These models are

represented by the following equation:
Yc,y = α + δ(Treat x Post)c,y + β1 Xc,y + dc + dy + ϵc,y

where, for county c and year y, Y represents the Voter Registration Rate in Model 1 or Voter
Turnout Rate in Model 2. Treat indicates that the observation is a county in a state that will
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implement AVR, and Post indicates that AVR has been implemented. Treat x Post is equal to 1
in all Oregon counties in 2016 and 2018 and is the primary treatment effect of interest in this
capstone. X is a vector of controls including demographics and political controls. Dc and dy
represent county and year fixed effects. Finally, 𝜖𝜖 is the error term.

As mentioned above, Model 1 uses the Voter Registration rate dependent variable,

defined as the number of registered voters in a county divided by its Citizen Voting Age
Population (CVAP), to test Hypothesis 1. Model 2 uses the Voter Turnout rate dependent
variable, defined as the number of votes for Congressional candidates cast in a county divided by
its CVAP, to test Hypothesis 2. Some counties are divided into multiple districts. The election
data reports from each state are divided by district and subdivided by county, so it would be
possible to structure a study to account for this intra-county variation. However, I was unable to
determine whether these county divisions corresponded to any subcounty Census geographies
such as tracts so accurate demographic data were not available. As a result, the vote totals used
in this capstone reflect the total number of Congressional Votes cast in each county regardless of
the district that they were cast for. Voter registration and vote total data were sourced from
historical election results reports maintained by the offices of the Oregon and Washington
Secretaries of State. CVAP data were sourced from the US Census Bureau’s “Citizen Voting
Age Population by Race and Ethnicity” data series.
Beyond this difference, both models use the same independent variables. The differencein-differences framework was constructed with a set of dummy variables. Typically, this is done
with a Treatment indicator, a Post indicator, and an interaction of Treatment and Post. However,
because the models use fixed effects regression to control for omitted variable bias caused by
underlying characteristics of each county and year, the Treatment and Post indicators were
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excluded from the final model. Their inclusion would have introduced issues with collinearity
with the equivalent indicators.
To control for other factors that affect voter turnout, both models have additional
covariates. My models include several of the measures cited in the Cancela and Geys (2016) and
Stockemer (2017) meta-analyses that were relevant in US Congressional elections. First, there
were a series of controls for aspects of the election. Because congressional elections are typically
an afterthought for voters, there are indicators for the statewide elections that receive more
attention and influence higher voter participation. The Governor indicator is set to 1 in 2012 and
2016 for Washington and in 2010, 2014, 2016, and 2018 for Oregon. 3 The Senate indicator is set
to 1 in 2010, 2012, 2016, and 2018 in Washington and 2010, 2014, and 2016 in Oregon. These
are all expected to increase voter participation and should have a positive relationship with both
dependent variables. I should note that all counties in the dataset were affected by the 2012 and
2016 Presidential elections, so their impact is captured by the year fixed effects. Finally, because
more competitive elections tend to have higher voter turnout, the models include the margin of
victory for the winning candidate as a measure of competitiveness. This was calculated by taking
the absolute value of the difference between the Congressional vote totals for the top two parties
divided by the total number of votes cast. A value of 0 would indicate that both parties received
the same number of votes and a value of 1 would indicate that one party received every vote
cast. 4Since more competitive elections tend to receive more votes, this is expected to have a
negative relationship with both dependent variables.

Gubernatorial elections in Oregon are usually held every four years in the same years as Congressional midterm
elections. However, a special gubernatorial election was held in 2016 for the remaining two years of Governor
John Kitzhaber’s term following his resignation on February 13, 2015 (Van Der Voo and Johnson 2015).
4
In Washington, all candidates in all parties participate in the primary and only the top-two vote getters move on
to the general election. In 2014 and 2016, this resulted in general election contests between two Republicans in
3
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There was also a series of demographic controls. I included the county-wide CVAP in order to
capture both the relative population in each county and the change in population from year to
year. In order to control for extreme values, the population was transformed using the natural
logarithm. The argument is that a lower population should increase voter turnout because voters
are more likely to feel that their vote will be decisive (Cancela and Geys 2016, 269). Median
income data were converted to 2018 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI-US-RS
Index to control for the effect of inflation and were transformed using the natural log to control
for extreme values. A higher median wage is expected to have a positive relationship. Data for
the percentage of CVAP with a bachelor’s degree or higher was included because more highly
educated individuals have been found to be more likely to vote. The model also includes the
proportion of CVAP represented by citizens in each age group: individuals aged 25-34, 35-44,
45-64, and older than 65 are compared to the excluded category of those aged 18-24. Older
individuals tend to vote more than younger individuals so all three of these age groups should
have positive coefficients (Brown and Wedeking 2006). Finally, the percentage of CVAP
represented by each racial or ethnic group is included. The percentage of Black, Hispanic/Latino,
Asian, Native American, and Pacific Islander individuals are compared to the excluded category,
the percentage of White individuals. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used
in this analysis.

WA-4. I treated both as if they were uncontested elections due to the ideology similarities between the two
candidates. The district was going to elect a Conservative Republican regardless of which candidate voters chose so
I did not consider the election to be competitive.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Differences of Means Tests

VARIABLES
Registration Rate (%)
Voter Turnout Rate (%)
Margin of Victory (%)
CVAP (logged)
Median Income ($2018
logged)
Bachelor's Degree or
More (%)
Age
18-24 (%)
25-34 (%)
35-44 (%)
45-64 (%)
>65 (%)
Race and Ethnicity
White (%)
Native American (%)
Asian (%)
Black (%)
Pacific Islander (%)
Latino/Hispanic (%)

Pre-Implementation
(Years 2010-2014)
Washington Oregon
Mean
Mean
(SD)
(SD)
0.791
0.756
(0.069) (0.063)
0.544
0.556
(0.111) (0.074)
0.289
0.381
(0.213)
(0.24)
10.622
10.28
(1.483) (1.525)
10.879 10.797
(0.168) (0.155)
0.211
0.201
(0.076) (0.067)

Post-Implementation
(Years 2016-2018)
Washington Oregon
Prob
Mean
Mean
>T
(SD)
(SD)
0.000
0.839
0.887
(0.068) (0.06)
0.320
0.609
0.636
(0.09) (0.063)
0.003
0.326
0.342
(0.247) (0.234)
0.090
10.671 10.316
(1.508) (1.553)
0.000
10.911 10.801
(0.168) (0.182)
0.260
0.232
0.215
(0.082) (0.077)

0.122
(0.065)
0.147
(0.036)
0.151
(0.026)
0.369
(0.048)
0.211
(0.057)

0.108
(0.04)
0.142
(0.032)
0.148
(0.026)
0.374
(0.032)
0.228
(0.054)

0.046

0.860
(0.078)
0.021
(0.027)
0.018
(0.022)
0.011
(0.014)
0.002
(0.002)
0.066
(0.073)

0.895
(0.040)
0.016
(0.024)
0.011
(0.014)
0.006
(0.008)
0.001
(0.001)
0.049
(0.035)

0.000
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0.277
0.463
0.372
0.022

0.204
0.004
0.001
0.053
0.028

Prob
>T
0.000
0.038
0.685
0.158
0.000
0.194

0.117
0.104 0.137
(0.065) (0.04)
0.15
0.146 0.483
(0.038) (0.028)
0.145
0.143 0.684
(0.025) (0.026)
0.346
0.348 0.675
(0.038) (0.025)
0.243
0.259 0.121
(0.068) (0.06)
0.841
(0.089)
0.02
(0.025)
0.02
(0.024)
0.012
(0.014)
0.003
(0.003)
0.079
(0.083)

0.874
(0.06)
0.017
(0.024)
0.012
(0.015)
0.007
(0.008)
0.002
(0.002)
0.064
(0.043)

0.008
0.399
0.013
0.005
0.068
0.161

.95
Statewide Registration Rate
.9
.8
.85
.75
2010

2012

2014
Year
Oregon

2016

2018

Washington

.45

Statewide Voter Turnout Rate
.5
.55
.6

.65

Figure 2. Parallel Trends Assumption: Model 1
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Year
Oregon

2016
Washington

Figure 3. Parallel Trends Assumption: Model 2
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Difference-in-differences Assumptions

Before discussing the results, it is necessary to review the assumptions required by the
difference-in-differences research design. The most important is the parallel trends assumption,
which states that the trend of the dependent variables should be approximately the same in both
the control and treatment groups prior to the implementation of the policy. Although this is an
important step in determining if the difference-in-differences design is appropriate, there is no
test that will determine if the assumption is met. Figures 2 and 3 plot the statewide mean of both
dependent variables for each year. The vertical line at 2016 indicates the implementation of AVR
in Oregon. Based on this figure, I would argue that the parallel trends assumption has been met
for both dependent variables. Both states increased their registration and voter turnout rates by
similar amounts when moving from 2010 to 2012 and both measures decreased by similar
amounts when moving from 2012 to 2014. Both states saw substantial increases in both
measures when moving from 2014 to 2016. The trends in Voter Registration diverged in 2016.
Oregon saw a much more substantial increase than Washington moving into 2016, which
continued into 2018. However, the trend in Voter Turnout remained much more similar for both
states in both the pre- and post-treatment periods. This may foreshadow that AVR caused an
increase in registration but that it did not encourage higher turnout. This is reinforced by the fact
that turnout was higher in Oregon in 2014; however, this may be explained by the gubernatorial
and Senate elections held in Oregon in that year. Because Washington had neither, I would
expect that turnout would be lower there.
To further test the parallel trends assumption, I calculated a difference of means t-test for
each variable by state in the periods before and after implementation. For this test, I calculated a
t statistic; the probability of this t statistic occurring by random chance is reported alongside the
summary statistics in Table 1. Based on the standard 95% significance level, I would be able to
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reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference by state for each variable if any t statistic is
found to have a reported probability of being found by random chance of 0.05 or less. In this
case, the difference in means for most of the variables is not statistically significant by state. This
suggests that this analysis is likely appropriate.
The registration rate, the dependent variable in model 1, was found to be significantly
higher in Washington in the period prior to the implementation of AVR and significantly higher
in Oregon following implementation. I believe that this change in the trend foreshadows a
statistically significant impact from AVR on voter registration. Similarly, the voter turnout rate,
the dependent variable in model 2, has no statistically significant difference in the pre period and
is significantly higher in Oregon in the post period. This would suggest that AVR has also had an
impact on voter turnout.
While most of the independent variables have no statistically significant difference,
several of the demographic controls do. This should not cause any issue with the analysis; the
inclusion of these variables in the model will control for any omitted variable bias for these
underlying differences. The margin of victory variable, in which a higher value corresponds to a
less competitive election, is significantly higher in Oregon in the pre period. Oregon seems to
have had less competitive elections on average than Washington. There are two main
explanations for this. First, general elections in Washington are limited to the top two vote
getters from the primary, which all candidates from all parties compete in; this is contrasted by
Oregon, which has a more typical system of allowing a candidate from each party to show up on
the ballot. Because the margin of victory variable was calculated as the difference between the
top two vote getters, the presence of third party candidates in Oregon may encourage voters that
otherwise would have voted for a major party candidate if their party were not on the ballot to
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vote. For instance, an Oregonian that wished to vote against the Democratic party would have
several choices, such as the Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, or the Constitution Party. A
similar Washingtonian would typically be limited to just the Republican Party. As a result, votes
in Oregon are typically more diffused than in Washington. Secondly, four of the five districts in
Oregon have been controlled by Democrats since 1997; Washington started the sample period
with six out of ten and ended the period with seven out of ten. Whether it is due to
gerrymandering or sorting, elections may just be less competitive in Oregon.

24

Results
Table 2. Difference-in-differences Naïve Estimates
Estimated Impact on Voter Registration
(A)
Treatment
Group
(OR)

(B)

(C) = (A) – (B)

Control
Group Treatment vs. Control
(WA)
Difference

(I) Pre-Reform (2010-2014)

0.756

0.791

-0.035

(II) Post-Reform (2016-2018)

0.887

0.839

0.048

0.131

0.048

0.083 (DID estimate)

(III) = (II) – (I) Post- vs. Pre-Reform
Difference

Estimated Impact on Voter Turnout
(A)

(I)

Pre-Reform (2010-2014)

(II)

Post-Reform (2016-2018)

(III) = (II) – (I)

Post- vs. Pre-Reform
Difference

Treatment
Group
(OR)
0.556

(B)

(C) = (A) – (B)

Control
Group Treatment vs. Control
(WA)
Difference
0.544
0.012

0.636

0.609

0.027

0.08

0.065

0.015 (DID Estimate)

Table 2 shows the naïve estimate of this study without the additional controls or fixed effects.
This suggests that AVR has a positive relationship with both voter registration and turnout.
Based on this, it can be expected that AVR caused an increase of approximately 0.083% for the
registration rate and an increase of approximately 0.015% for the turnout rate. The results of the
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full regression with fixed effects are detailed in Table 3. Notably, the difference-in-differences
indicator is significant in both models. This suggests that AVR does have an impact on both
voter registration and voter turnout rates, with the treatment effect of implementing AVR being
associated with an increase of 0.065 in the Registration rate and an increase of 0.026 in the Voter
Turnout rate. This analysis, therefore, confirms Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. However, the
difference in magnitude suggests that AVR has a greater impact on voter registration than it does
on turnout.
The covariates generally went in the predicted directions, although several were not
significant. The political controls had mixed performance. The gubernatorial and senate election
indicators were significant in the voter registration model; the senate election indicator and
margin of victory measure were significant in the voter turnout model. While the gubernatorial
indicator and the margin of victory had coefficients in the predicted signs, the senate indicator
had a positive coefficient as predicted in the voter turnout model but a negative coefficient in the
voter registration model. Moving to the demographic variables, the logged CVAP variable was
significant with the predicted coefficient sign in both models. Many of the age variables were not
significant, although the few that are significant are consistent with the prediction that a greater
population of older individuals would have higher electoral participation. Moving to the race and
ethnicity variables, only the Asian and Latino variables were significant in the Registration
model. None of the race and ethnicity variables were significant at the 95% level in the voter
turnout model. The design of this study does not examine the heterogenous effects of this policy
on different racial or ethnic groups so further research is needed to explore this complex impact.
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Difference-in-differences Regression Estimates
VARIABLES
Treat*Post
Gubernatorial Election
Senatorial Election
Margin of Victory (%)
Citizen Voting Age Population (logged)
Median Income ($2018 logged)
Bachelor's Degree or More (%)
Age
24-34 (%)

-0.132
(0.284)
0.265
(0.439)
0.703**
(0.355)
0.337
(0.450)

-0.726**
(0.310)
0.099
(0.382)
0.114
(0.374)
-0.147
(0.456)

-0.695
(0.657)
-1.709***
(0.608)
1.317
(0.934)
-0.451
(0.975)
-0.447**
(0.181)
2.067***
(0.761)

0.235
(0.579)
-1.281*
(0.724)
0.796
(1.212)
0.748
(1.422)
-0.445
(0.363)
2.824***
(0.808)

375
0.960
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Fixed Effects Not Shown

375
0.902

35-44 (%)
45-64 (%)
>65 (%)
Race/Ethnicity
Native American (%)
Asian (%)
Black (%)
Pacific Islander (%)
Latino/Hispanic (%)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
Model 1: Voter Model 2: Voter
Registration
Turnout
0.065***
0.026***
(0.004)
(0.008)
0.020***
-0.003
(0.003)
(0.006)
-0.027***
0.032***
(0.004)
(0.006)
-0.005
-0.042***
(0.007)
(0.015)
-0.184**
-0.253***
(0.072)
(0.072)
0.011
0.017
(0.040)
(0.042)
-0.222
0.133
(0.139)
(0.169)
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Limitations
Although these results confirm my hypotheses, there are a series of limitations to the capstone that may
bias the findings. First, the demographic data came from ACS. Because these data are estimates, it is
possible that there were undercounts or overcounts in these figures that would distort the results.
Secondly, this capstone defined voter registration and turnout using the Citizen Voting Age Population.
Although this removed many of the ineligible voters that would have been included if I had used Voting
Age Population, CVAP is less accurate than the Voting Eligible Population and includes some number of
individuals who are legally barred from voting. Because CVAP estimates include more individuals and
are therefore higher than VEP estimates, the registration and turnout numbers are likely to be slightly
higher than were reported in this capstone.
Secondly, this project is incredibly limited. It only considers five elections held in two states and
is only able to consider results from two elections following the introduction of AVR. A more
comprehensive study that is able to include more of the country would help to predict the impact of AVR
in other states. Including more states would also researchers to determine if AVR has a greater impact in
states that allow data to be transferred from state agencies that are not DMVs; if turnout is lower among
the population that is less likely to need to drive, allowing more participating agencies could greatly
increase the impact. Additionally, a project with a longer time horizon would help to determine if AVR
continues to have an impact after its introduction or if these findings only hold shortly following its
implementation.
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Conclusion
Based on this capstone, I can conclude that Automatic Voter Registration is a policy that is likely
to encourage increases in voter registration, which in turn is likely to encourage increases in
voter turnout. Since this is the primary purpose of the policy, it could be easy for me to claim
that it should be implemented in every state to encourage as many citizens as possible to
participate in the electoral process. However, this project is ultimately a very limited look at this
policy, being focused on five elections in two states that represent a vast minority of the total US
population. The Pacific Northwest states do not look like the US as a whole demographically and
have had enjoyed less restrictive electoral processes than those seen in other regions. It is likely
that these fundamental differences between that region and the rest of the US could mean that
Automatic Voter Registration may have a different impact elsewhere. Although this project
provides a promising first look at the impact of Automatic Voter Registration, a more
comprehensive study is needed to truly measure the impact of this policy. Ideally, such a project
would be able to have a national scope to include other types of electoral environments and the
opportunity to include more elections post-implementation to ensure that any increase in Voter
Turnout measured is permanent. However, I believe that this project can serve as a guide for how
a more comprehensive study could be structured. In short, I believe that this capstone can
demonstrate to policy makers the need to investigate this policy further.
The evidence from this capstone may also suggest that AVR needs to be available from
more agencies rather than just from the DMV. My results suggest that higher population counties
and counties with higher proportions of non-white individuals are still less likely to participate in
elections even with AVR. Expanding AVR to agencies that these individuals interact with more
often would be likely to increase its impact, although this study is not able to measure that. The
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lower rates of participation in these groups are likely to be a factor in the lack of representation
of these groups in the legislature and the lack of focus paid to their most important issues. Since
solving this issue is the primary goal of increasing electoral participation among low-propensity
voters, states need to properly target AVR to maximize its impact.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss the divergent focuses that different states are currently
placing on election administration policy. While some states have the goal of increasing the ease
of voting by implementing policies like AVR, other states are making moves to make voting
harder in order to lessen their perceived risk of voter fraud. Despite the fact that there is no
evidence that this is a widespread issue, beliefs that elections are not secure have been on the
rise. As a result, while I think that further study of AVR is needed, policies like AVR may be a
hard sell to those states. Because of this, there will likely be a greater difference in electoral
representation between these states than there currently is. Because policies are often enacted to
allow elected officials to court likely voters, this anticipated lower representation can have
serious equity consequences that will prevent policies that will help those with lower
socioeconomic status and members of minority groups. Reforms to electoral administration
policy can play a strong role in offsetting inequity and implementing policies AVR can impact
many other actions taken by government.

30

References
2018. "Automatic Voter Registration Act, Wa. HB 2595, Washington 65th Legislature (2018)."
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2595S2.SL.pdf.
Barnes, Tiffany D., and Gabriela Rangel. 2014. "Election Law Reform in Chile: The Implementation of
Automatic Registration and Voluntary Voting." Election Law Journal 13 (4): 570-582.
Brown, Robert D., and Justin Wedeking. 2006. "People Who Have Their Tickets But Do Not Use Them:
“Motor Voter,” Registration, and Turnout Revisited." American Politics Research 34 (3): 479504. doi:10.1177/1532673X05281122.
Cancela, João, and Benny Geys. 2016. "Explaining voter turnout: A meta-analysis of national and
subnationalelections." Electoral Studies 42: 264-275. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2016.03.005.
Cox, James C., Daniel Kreisman, and Susan Dynarski. 2020. "Designed to fail: Effects of the default
option and informationcomplexity on student loan repayment." Journal of Public Economics 192:
1-19. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104298.
Desilver, Drew. 2020. "In past elections, U.S. trailed most developed countries in voter turnout." Pew
Research Center. November 3. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/in-pastelections-u-s-trailed-most-developed-countries-in-voter-turnout/.
Fairvote. 2020. Voter Turnout. Accessed November 17, 2020.
https://www.fairvote.org/voter_turnout#voter_turnout_101.
Griffin, Rob, Paul Gronke, Tova Wang, and Liz Kennedy. 2017. Who Votes With Automatic Voter
Registration? Impact Analysis of Oregon’s First-in-the-Nation Program. June 7.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/06/07/433677/votesautomatic-voter-registration/.
Highton, Benjamin, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1998. "Estimating the Effects of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993." Political Behavior 20 (2).
Holbrook, Thomas, and Brianna Heidbreder. 2010. "Does Measurement Matter? The Case of VAP and
VEP in Models of Voter Turnout in the United States." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 10 (2).
http://www.jstor.com/stable/27867141.
Hyde, Elizabeth M. 2019. "A Bipartisan Policy For Democracy: Why Automatic Voter Registration Is
Right For Indiana." Indiana Law Review 52 (3): 481-509.
https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/ilr/pdf/vol52p481.pdf.
Jachimowicz, Jon M., Duncan, Shannon, Elke U. Weber, and Eric J. Johnson. 2019. "When and why
defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects." Behavioural Public Policy 3 (2):
159-186. doi:doi:10.1017/bpp.2018.43.
Johnson, Eric J., and Daniel Goldstein. 2003. "Do Defaults Save Lives?" Science 302 (5649): 1338-1339.
doi:DOI: 10.1126/science.1091721 .

31

Knack, Stephen. 1995. "Does "Motor Voter" Work? Evidence from State-Level Data." The Journal of
Politics 57 (3): 796-811.
Mann, Christopher B., Paul Gronke, and Natalie Adona. 2020. "Framing Automatic Voter Registration:
Partisanship and Public Understanding of Automatic Voter Registration." American Politics
Research 48 (6): 693-699. doi:0.1177/1532673X20922525.
Morris, Kevin, and Peter Dunphy. 2019. AVR Impact on State Voter Registration. April 11.
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf.
National Conference of State Legislatures. 2020. Automatic Voter Registration. April 14.
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration.aspx.
—. 2020. "Same Day Voter Registration." October 6. https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/same-day-registration.aspx.
2015. "Or. HB 2177, 78th Oregon Legislative Assembly."
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB2177/Enrolled.
Saad, Lydia. 2016. Trump and Clinton Finish With Historically Poor Images. November 8.
https://news.gallup.com/poll/197231/trump-clinton-finish-historically-poor-images.aspx.
Stockemer, Daniel. 2017. "What Affects Voter Turnout? A Review Article/Meta-Analysis of Aggregate
Research." Government and Opposition 52 (4): 698-722. doi:10.1017/gov.2016.30.
Thaler, Richard H., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2003. "Libertarian Paternalism." The American Economic
REview 93 (2): 175-179. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3132220.
Van Der Voo, Lee, and Kirk Johnson. 2015. "Gov. John Kitzhaber of Oregon Resigns Amid Crisis." The
New York Times, February 13. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/us/kitzhaber-resigns-asgovernor-of-oregon.html.
Wang, Hansi Lo. 2021. "Census Bureau Stops Work On Trump's Request For Unauthorized Immigrant
Count." NPR, January 13. https://www.npr.org/2021/01/13/956352495/census-bureau-stopswork-on-trumps-request-for-unauthorized-immigrant-count.
Washington Elections Division. n.d. Same Day Registration.
https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/research/same-day-registration.aspx.

32

Appendix: AVR Year of Implementation and Participating Agencies by State
State
Alaska

Year of
Implementation
2017

California
Colorado

2018
2017

Connecticut
District of
Columbia
Georgia
Illinois

2016
2018

Participating Agencies

Type of Opt-Out

Permanent Fund Dividend Notification Sent
only
DMV only
At Agency
DMV, Department of Health,
At Agency
and other designated by
Secretary of State
DMV only
At Agency
DMV only
At Agency

2016
2018

DMV only
At Agency
DMV and other designated
At Agency
AVR agencies
Maine
2022
DMV and other designated
At Agency
“source agencies”
Maryland
2019
DMV, health benefit
At Agency
exchange, Department of
Social Services, and Mobility
Certification Office
Massachusetts
2020
DMV, division of medical Notification Sent
assistance, health insurance
connector authority, other
agencies that collect “reliable
citizenship information”
Michigan
2019
DMV only
At Agency
New Jersey
2018 DMV and other designated by
At Agency
Secretary of State
New Mexico
2018
DMV only
At Agency
New York
2023
DMV, DOH, DOL and
At Agency
additional agencies
Nevada
2020
DMV only
At Agency
Oregon
2016
DMV only Notification Sent
Rhode Island
2018
DMV and others designated
At Agency
by Secretary of State
Vermont
2017
DMV and others designated
At Agency
by Secretary of State
Virginia
2020
DMV only
At Agency
Washington
2019
DMV, health benefit
At Agency
exchange, other state agencies
designated by governor
West Virginia
2019
DMV only
At Agency
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures
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